

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Objective Force Leadership

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ABSTRACT

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This paper examines the intended nature of the United States Army's Objective Force and offers specific ideas for leadership development. Acknowledging many written documents and work done by both the United States Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and private persons on the subject of the Objective Force, I hope to contribute to this expansive and deepening dialogue. Effective leadership is essential for any combat force on campaign. It will be particularly important for the Objective Force. Given expected technological developments and the procurement plan, this force will field capabilities of unprecedented mobility, target acquisition, lethality and means of communication in the not too distant future. These capabilities will allow for fast-paced, decentralized yet coordinated campaigns that can strike decisively at an enemy's vitals. The successful battlefield exploitation of these technological advances will be an entirely human effort. That human effort will require inspired leadership.

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PREFACE

Today as our Armed Forces fight our enemies in South West Asia, South Asia, and in many other parts of the globe we observe that the nature of war and combat remains essentially unchanged. Though our weapons have become increasingly more effective and our tactics and organizations for fighting have thus evolved, what remains constant is the fact that war and combat remains a brutal test of human wills. Our enemies are displaying the ability to adapt technological advantages. Our soldiers and airmen are adapting to deal with adaptive enemies. Gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy; killing and wounding him with fires; and maneuvering to finish him are as challenging as ever. Information, mobility, firepower, protection, and leadership remain essential to the generation of overwhelming combat power. The challenges of conducting operations over great strategic distances and in remote, austere locations complicates the conduct of war, but American fighting forces have faced these daunting challenges before and certainly will continue to do so.

As we fight we also look forward. We imagine how future war will be waged. Assessing the United States' strategic situation and the threats into the future, it is easy acknowledge the requirement to modernize and transform our military and naval forces. The capabilities of our most modern technologies demonstrated today on the battlefield and proving grounds provide us glimpses of extraordinary future potential. This potential allows us to visualize future war and combat being waged in significantly different ways than today or the recent past.

The United States Army's vision, however, acknowledges that in the end conflict will remain a human endeavor. Consequently inspired military leadership to provide purpose, direction and motivation will remain vital. The Army also affirms that ground forces will remain indispensable to achieve the ultimate requirement to control an enemy's terrain, resources, and population to achieve decisive victory.

At its most fundamental level, war is a brutal contest of wills. Winning decisively means dominating our enemies. Potential opponents must be convinced that we are able to break them physically and psychologically and that we are willing to bear the costs of doing so. For some opponents, mere punishment from afar is not enough. With these adversaries, the only way to guarantee victory is to put our boots on his ground, impose ourselves on his territory, and destroy him in his sanctuaries...This is the foundation of decisive operations.¹

The challenge for the Army is to fight these battles anywhere the United States has interests and against any enemy. This requires us to be prepared to alert and deploy on short notice; travel great distances; and, on arrival, fight successfully operating under any set of local conditions. We will have to be able to do this as part of joint, inter-agency, or multi-national forces. Operations can range from peace-keeping to mid to high-intensity warfare.

Rapidly expanding United States political and economic interests around the globe not only increase opportunities for better relations and wealth creation but also increase exposure and risk exposures that will have to be defended when threatened. Regional instabilities, aggressive regimes, terrorists, organized crime, and the proliferation of advanced weapons ensure a varied, unpredictable, and dangerous set of threats. Gone are the days when the Army could focus on a small number of specific theatres, adversaries, and missions pursuant to a long-established and little

¹ U.S. Army, White Paper: Concepts for the Objective Force (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), v.

changing national military strategy. Today and into the future the Army must be prepared for any challenge, any time, and anywhere.

The National Security Strategy of September 2002 acknowledges this new reality. It is a strategy of engagement and cooperation with allies, friends, and those who seek our partnership. It is also a strategy for preemption against our enemies. It has expanded our strategies beyond deterrence.

The Objective Force is the Army's response to meet tomorrow's threats. The Objective Force is intended to be a force of unprecedented combat power that can be employed against any enemy, at any location on the globe, and achieve decisive victory. Exploiting science and industry's most advanced technologies the Army will arm its soldiers with superior weapons and equipment. This technological superiority, coupled with combined-arms organization, quality training, and joint force integration is intended to give our Army the tactical power of "firsts"; "see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively."²

Accepting the possibility that much of the technological advances intended for the Objective Force will be realized and the fact that the human nature of future combat will remain unchanged, I shall offer some ideas about leadership attributes and skills needed for the force if it is to realize its fullest operational potential.

I am sincerely grateful to Dr. Douglas Johnson, USA, Ret., Pd.D., of the United States Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute for his professional guidance and assistance during the preparation of this paper. I would also like to thank Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen, USA, also of the Strategic Studies Institute, for his patience and willingness to help me organize my many thoughts.

Further, I must also thank Lieutenant Colonel Roger Cirillo, USA, Ret., Ph.D., of the Association of the United States Army. He questions, coaching and unmatched knowledge of our Army's history provided me both encouragement and direction. I also wish to show my appreciation to General Donn Starry, USA, Ret.; Lieutenant General Bill Carter, USA, Ret.; Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege, USA, Ret.; Colonel John Rosenburger, USA; Colonel Leo Rios, USA; Mr. Steven Zaloga; Lieutenant Colonel Scott Farquhar, USA; MAJ Chris Kolenda, USA; and LTC Kevin McEnry, USA, Ret. All of these gentlemen offered superb guidance.

In particular, I must express my deepest regard and thanks to Colonel Daniel C. Williamson, USA, Ret., of the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command. His friendship, assistance and expert knowledge about the Objective Force were absolutely invaluable as was his ability to endure my repeated visits and conversations.

² Ibid., 6.

OBJECTIVE FORCE LEADERSHIP

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the on-going dialogue about the United States Army's efforts to transform itself into a twenty-first century force of unprecedented and overwhelming combat power. The Objective Force is intended to be a technologically sophisticated force designed to wage violent, fast-paced operational "deep battle" in any given theatre.¹ It will alert and deploy across strategic distances against any enemy in any type of terrain. It will be a force optimized for offensive operations. It will commit our strengths against identified enemy weaknesses we can exploit through rapid fire and maneuver to strike at what our enemy finds most dear. The goal is to preempt long, costly wars of attrition.

We can be certain that regardless of technological advances and the impact they will have on war and combat what will remain constant into the future is the power of quality leaders at both operational and tactical levels. It will be the *sine qua non* for harnessing and exploiting the information, firepower, protection and mobility of the Objective Force. The question to ask ourselves today is: will the Objective Force require leaders that are significantly different from those we have today?

I intend to argue for the importance of a set of leadership attributes and competencies that we will have to more fully develop and leverage in the Army's future leaders if we are to realize the full potential of the Objective Force. Specifically these include: responsibility, knowledge of one's mission, will, aggressiveness, initiative, professional skill and flexibility. I do not intend on critiquing, duplicating or abridging our current leadership doctrine (Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership), however, I do wish to emphasize that certain attributes and skills are more important than others in the conduct of successful future offensive combat operations.

What will make the Objective Force truly lethal will be our ability to force our enemies to react to our campaign design and combat methods. The intended capability to enter a theatre at just about any point with highly mobile and lethal forces will give us great opportunities to surprise our enemies. That coupled with the ability to subsequently and repeatedly defeat enemy forces in fast-paced, violent tactical engagements by mobile, decentralized units will offer paths by which to defeat enemy forces by dislocation and disintegration rather than by sequential, set-piece battles of attrition. This, of course, will demand leaders of great imagination, daring, fighting skill, responsibility and independence. It will fall on their shoulders to visualize enemy strengths, weakness and centers of gravity. They will have to design the operational concepts to attack decisive objectives while exploiting operational surprise and tactical prowess. In the fight, where victory will be secured, it will only be they who will be able to motivate, direct and provide purpose to our soldier who in the end will defeat the enemy.

THE STRATEGIC OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

On current evidence, the next few decades will confront the United States with an unstable and highly uncertain geostrategic environment. Potential military threats may emerge from revanchists or aspiring great powers, new regional alignments and/or transitional terrorist or criminal organizations. The global explosion in communications, together with continuing proliferation of military technologies, will allow even less wealthy states to field ground combat capabilities once reserved only for armies fielded and supported by fully industrialized economies.²

These threats can be conventional, non-conventional, state supported, or non-state supported or combinations thereof. Each will differ in terms of the ends, ways, and means by which we approach them. Most likely we can expect deployment to regions where we might not have forces already stationed. This will require air, land, and sea forces to be moved and sustained over great distances and probably in difficult terrain.

Our adversaries and potential enemies also will have learned from history and events. They will have means and ways to fight effectively. Some will display extraordinary skill, will and courage. Many will not share our values and basic assumptions about just behavior. Engagements will be as ferocious as any of the most desperate in the twentieth century.

Viewed from the "other side of the hill" United States forces may be viewed strategically as slow to respond, hesitant to become involved in prolonged wars, and fearful of casualties, both American and non-combatant. Operationally, our requirements for developed air and sea ports, established lines of communication, and robust logistic support may make us appear yet more vulnerable. Further, a desire only to seek set-piece battle in open terrain after periods of rigid planning may paint us as tactically plodding and predictable.³

Respecting United States space and air power abilities to acquire, control and execute precision fires with great standoff an enemy will work to avoid detection, engagement, and destruction. The use of complex terrain or the collocation with civilians in ever expanding urban areas can be expected. Adversaries will avoid massed formations, remain dispersed, maximize concealment, and reinforce covered positions.⁴

We should not assume that these threat forces will not develop sophisticated capabilities. Highly developed weapons and equipment are being sold around the world each day. In 2001 Russia surpassed the United States in foreign military sale for the first time in recent memory. Russia retains over 22,000 main battle tanks and 21,000 artillery pieces. Any of these can be sold. Not including the United States, China, Russia, Great Britain, Iran and Iraq, 18 countries are armed with tank inventories of over 1,000 tanks each. Access to space based systems and services are

also increasing. This most recent development may enable threat forces to access military applications formerly reserved for United States forces.

In sum, we can expect future adversaries to fight not only with will, but with skill, armed with deadly anti-aircraft systems, anti-armor weapons, mines, armor, and first class small arms. Some may effectively contest United States control of the air space, local or otherwise. To be prudent the Army must expect to fight particularly difficult adversaries in any future conflict.

It is still possible to imagine a crisis in which one power within a region swiftly invades and forces the capitulation of a neighbor, or there could be the successful seizure of power from within an existing state by an internal, malevolent force: a *coup d'état*. In each situation the aggressor would hope to gain control and consolidate power as rapidly as possible. Thereafter the aggressor would defend gains against any sort of counteraction. Efforts would focus on anti-access and force security measures. Potential points of entry for United States counter offensive forces would be blocked and enemy combat forces would position themselves to prevent destruction by American long-range precision fires. The aggressor could then use all of his elements of strategic and operational power to delay. In the event of a United States counter offensive, the enemy might attempt to fight a long, frustrating war of attrition. The enemy would do his best to avoid large-scale, decisive engagements and instead attack our real or perceived vulnerabilities through out the depth of the area of operation (i.e. Fabian tactics). He would hope to do this by preserving as much as his forces as possible. This strategy would be intended to exhaust us. They would aim to erode our will and that of our friends and allies.

The United States would hope to be able to deter the above by a timely forward positioning of forces or through the establishment of a security assistance effort. These prescient actions in concert with the exercise of other elements of national power could be enough to deter aggression. In some situations these actions may not be possible or effective. Rapid, armed reaction may be the only option.

AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE REQUIREMENT

An armed response to an act of aggression far from the United States requires a national capacity to execute "operational maneuver from strategic distances." Objective Forces would alert and deploy air, land, sea, and space forces to distant regions. These forces will have to be fully trained and ready for immediate deployment. As partners in a joint, inter-agency or multi-national team these forces are to be prepared to fight on arrival. Entry into theatre can be opposed or unopposed. The area will often lack infrastructure such as sea port, airports, or improved roads.

As sea and land forces alert, deploy, and converge into an area of operation a combatant commander would refine intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) efforts to gather information about the enemy, terrain and weather. ISR forces would exploit both national level

capabilities and joint aerospace systems to gain electronic, photo, and visual contact with the enemy. From such efforts a combatant commander could finalize a concept of operation, develop target data for an operational fires plan, and execute an initial fires attack against identified targets. Long-range strategic and operational precision lethal and non-lethal fires could be initiated from air, sea, and land systems. In short by exploiting networked, high-technology joint capabilities, the commander can begin to set favorable conditions in theatre from strategic distances. This would be done as ground forces closed into the joint operations area (JOA) to identified positions of advantage for initial entry. The pattern is much like that of a meeting engagement except that one side has superior knowledge of the other.

As in meeting engagements speed matters. "The longer it takes the United States and its allies to project an operationally significant force, the more effective... [an adversary's]...anti-access efforts are likely to be."⁵ To preempt an attacking enemy before he achieves all of his operational objectives or consolidates his gains our ability to engage him rapidly with both long range precision fires and ground maneuver forces would be of great advantage. An aggressive defeat of an enemy's anti-access and delaying tactics would allow us to begin work to seize the operational initiative.

Ultimately the United States forces would have to sustain an ever increasing operational tempo. Specifically we would have to reinforce initial entry forces with a steady stream of follow-on elements; this while executing and sustaining combat operations by forces already engaged.

It...is important to understand that the critical measure of successful force projection is not the speed with which the first combat elements engages, but rather the rate at which the U.S. and its allies are able to achieve overall operational superiority, depriving an enemy of freedom of action and making his ultimate defeat both inevitable and irreversible. U.S. forces therefore must be able to rapidly translate the initiative gained by forcible entry into decisive operations against key enemy capabilities or vulnerabilities in depth.⁶

American forces have frequently conducted operations using long lines of communication. It is a challenge with which we are well familiar. We also have an unmatched tradition of joint interoperability. No other nation ever conducted amphibious or air-ground operations on a scope or scale approaching what our forces conducted in the twentieth century. Skill at power projection across the globe is a uniquely American feat of arms. Today however we present ourselves the challenge of doing these inherently complex operations more rapidly with an eye toward decisive campaigns and doing so without the long, vulnerable lines of communication.

THE OBJECTIVE FORCE

For the U.S. Army, the Objective Force is intended to fulfill this expeditionary role as part of a joint expeditionary force. It is intended to be rapidly deployable, versatile and lethal. The aim is to be

able to commit a brigade-sized force to combat in 96 hours and a division-sized unit in 120 hours. After thirty days five divisions are to be in the fight. For each, immediately on entry into theatre, they are to be able to fight and win against any adversary. Each brigade-sized force is to be able to fight and move without replenishment for a period of three to seven days. Organically combined-arms, these forces are to be able to fight mounted, mounted while supported by dismounted forces, or dismounted while supported by mounted forces. High mobility is intended to allow this force to move at speeds superior to the enemy. At tactical levels this is to be insured by vehicles designed to have high horse power, all-terrain traction and robust suspension. Advanced target acquisition and weapons that can engage at extended ranges with killing shots are also intended to give Objective Force soldiers freedom of action within the enemy's battle space. Sophisticated counter-mine and bridging are intended to overcome obstacles. At an operational level the brigade-size units are to be able to move by ground using organic vehicles or by air using theatre lift. The intent is to have the potential to be able to out maneuver the opponent at both a tactical and operational level.

The force's lethality will be based upon superb target acquisition technologies and highly-accurate, deadly weapons. These weapons will be line-of-sight (LOS), beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) and non-line-of-sight (NLOS). That is direct fire, indirect fire under control of local maneuver commanders, and supporting indirect fire respectively. These integrated systems are designed to allow our soldiers to detect enemy troops and equipment long before the enemy detects our presence. With that information Objective Force elements can then deploy, maneuver, and engage the acquired enemy at ranges beyond those of the adversary's weapons. These weapons are both mounted and dismounted as well as either manned or unmanned. Complete integration with airborne forces is implicit. Objective Force units are to exploit information and target data collected from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), manned aircraft, and satellites. It is also to be capable of rapidly exploiting and directing close air support. The intent is to be able to attack the enemy with the full weight of available joint fires at any point on the battlefield.

In terms of organization the Objective Force is presently designed to be echeloned with units of action (UA) and units of employment (UE). This roughly corresponds to brigades and divisions/corps respectively. The UA is a combined-arms, close combat team that can be reinforced as needed for its assigned tactical tasks. It is designed to win engagements. It is capable of independent combat actions. The UE is intended to operate at either a "higher" tactical or an operational level. There can be several UEs between a UA and a combatant commander. In short, one UE could fulfill the role of a "division" headquarters while another, a "corps", and so on. UEs commanding UAs focus on winning major battles. They attack enemy key capabilities. Intended on being a combined-arms, air-ground task force, it can operate as the Army Forces (ARFOR) Component, a Joint Force Land Component (JFLCC), or a Joint Task Force (JTF). The UEs commanding subordinate UEs execute campaigns to achieve operational objectives in theatre.

They, also, can operate as an ARFOR Component, JFLCC or JTF. These higher echelon UEs are also combined-arms, air-ground commands. Operationally they dislocate an enemy throughout the depth of the theatre by disorganizing and disintegrating his systems. They thus are capable of decisive land campaigns aimed at supporting joint operational or strategic objectives.

Of fundamental importance to the potential success of the Objective Force is its ability to acquire, manage, distribute, and exploit information. The force is to have "information superiority." This superiority is designed to allow leaders and soldiers to see the enemy long before the enemy sees and reacts to them. Clear, timely, and accurate information will allow leaders to make sound tactical assessments and soldiers to strike the enemy at range. Further, leaders and soldiers are to be able to see themselves on the terrain in relation to the enemy in real time. One might imagine a combat training center "screen shot." Most remarkable is the idea that this visibility of the area of operation is to be shared or "distributed" to each manned aircraft, vehicle, and dismount element on easily comprehensible displays. Clearly that data will be managed so that each echelon within the command is presented useful information for its respective task or role. This, coupled with reliable voice communications and message services, will allow for a common understanding of the general situation: a "common operational picture" (COP). Essential to this capability is a wide-band, digital network that links sensors to leaders and soldiers and again to weapon systems.

The Unit of Employment is a knowledge-based force organized and designed to operate within the network-centric and collaborative information environment (CIE) of the future. Information superiority (IS) is essential to the fundamental concept of simultaneous, distributed operations....Drawing information, updated in near real time, from a wide variety of automated and manual sources---on-board sensor, unmanned air and ground vehicles, traditional and new ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] means, space platforms, and an assortment of correlated databases---this knowledge backbone will be focused on improving and accelerating the decision-action cycle. The network will provide the means for forces at all levels to achieve situational understanding (SU) and establish, maintain, and distribute a common (joint) operating picture tailored to the force and situation.

Advance C4ISR [command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] network will sharply enhance the lethality, survivability, agility, and versatility of the force, enabling more effective and timely application of the elements of combat power.⁷

In regard to battle command; command and control; and planning, the above described capability is intended to allow for more rapid reports, estimates, decisions, and orders. The enhanced visual and voice means of communication will allow for more "give and take" among commanders as they assess situations, offer recommendations and finalize battle orders. Less time will be spent on discussing basic situational facts like friendly combat power or positioning. Commanders should be able to make better decisions more rapidly. They will also have better

means by which to issue more effective orders (clear, concise, flexible, timely, etc.). Perhaps most importantly, a commander will be able to remain forward where he wishes. He will not be tethered to staff or main command post. Embedded, robust, and reliable digital capabilities on-board his combat vehicle will allow him to conduct leader reconnaissance, confer with fellow commanders and visit soldiers without losing a “main command post” quality situational understanding: “battle command on the move.” Further, coordination for critical functions such as reconnaissance and fires are completed in a more timely manner. The commander will also have the ability to “reach back” to gather specific data or information. That is, he will be able to answer questions he may have about details relevant to the situation at hand or pending operations. He will have access to staffs, data banks, or experts networked on the information web. Some of these could be national level assets. Depending upon the skill and temperament of the commanding officer, this has the potential to allow for a “deliberate planning” level of quality for combat orders in a very short time period. Rapid fragmentary orders will become the norm. This means well directed, lethal and rapid action—higher tempo.

Investment in the right technologies could tend to greatly expand the likelihood that organizations will function in “deliberate” settings, those in which the understanding of relevant factors is high and thus capabilities can be optimized. The traditional military definition for the word “deliberate,” as in deliberate attack or deliberate defense, reflects the condition and terms of the engagement more than the time and extent of preparations.⁸

Emerging battle command doctrine for the Objective Force requires a “mission command” culture. That is, military operations are to be conducted in a decentralized manner where local commanders pursue objectives based on mission orders. Leaders are to exercise disciplined initiative within their commander’s intent. It requires understanding of one’s mission, acceptance of risk, independence of action and tactical proficiency. Superiors are to provide subordinates brief and simple orders and give maximum latitude and minimum control. “It requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding.”⁹

What all the above means in concept is the potential for being able to see the enemy first, understand the overall situation first, act first, and finish an engagement decisively. This has been described as the “quality of firsts.”¹⁰ At both the tactical and operational levels it also provides the opportunity to execute distributed, simultaneous combat operations across the depth of the battlefield or joint operational area. This means UAs and UEs can operate in a non-contiguous manner. Forces will be able to fight decentralized but in a coordinated manner. As they do so they will have a clear understand of each others situation as well as an over-arching COP. This C4ISR

capability coupled with long-range, precision fires; vertical envelopment; mobile strike; and self-contained, combined-arms UAs allow for a twenty-first century version of “deep battle.”

For an enemy this would mean attacks from his front, flanks and rear. He would suffer fire attacks from weapons beyond his line of sight without being able to return in kind. His vulnerabilities would be assaulted and his strengths by-passed. His key political centers would be under direct threat or seized by *coup d’main*. He would lose control of key terrain. His vital resources would be captured or destroyed. Critical support system would face direct attacks. The loss of supplies, communications, and fire support would take away his capacity to fight a coordinated and sustained campaign. Some of his maneuver units would be annihilated in combined fire strikes and close assaults. Most would be isolated and contained. He would lose freedom of action. His soldiers would lose the ability to fight or even to defend themselves. At some point the enemy would lose the will to carry on.

Objective Force corps and divisions conduct sustained land counter-offensive operations within the joint campaign to establish land force dominance, wrest the initiative from the enemy, force him on the defensive, and defeat him in detail...The combination of joint precision strike against enemy forces, which will tend to drive him to disperse, avoid large-scale maneuver and seek sanctuary, combined with all-arms capabilities of the Objective Force corps and divisions to find, root out, and destroy those forces, will afford the enemy no rest, relief, or sanctuary,¹¹ and no means of responding effectively to this relentless, multi-dimensional assault.

A CONCEPT ASSESSED

The Objective Force is an unequivocal argument for the offense. Its aim is rapid victory. It challenges leaders to “dictate the nature, scope, and tempo of ... operation[s].”¹² It demands leaders use their imagination, will and skill to find ways to force the enemy to react to us. Leaders will be expected to exploit enemy vulnerabilities; maintain freedom of action; and react to rapidly changing situations and unexpected developments. Given the aforementioned threat estimate, Objective Force units should not be blocked by enemy “anti-access” efforts or delayed by his security operations, nor allowed to find sanctuary. If he finds sanctuary, he leaves wounded, as a prisoner of war, or is buried in it. At no time do we fight along his time line. We do not allow the chance of a stalemate.

The Objective Force concept demands daring and imagination: envisioning operations and tactics that aim at dislocating and disintegrating the foe. It does not advocate tightly-controlled and rigidly sequenced battles designed to annihilate the enemy’s main body sub-unit by sub-unit or to “clear zone” with set-piece, linear tactics. The Objective Forces simultaneously attack the enemy throughout his depth with distributed fires and maneuver units. The vertical envelopment of UA forces that are superbly armed, digitally connected, and highly mobile are the means with which to

enter the enemy's rear and threaten what he hopes to protect or what he must have to support his ability to fight (e.g. state capital, operational reserves, supplies, key terrain, C2 nodes, etc.). Highly concentrated and readily shifted precision fires can deliver destruction on confirmed enemy forces to support deep maneuver. Maneuver and fires to the front and rear of the enemy main body force him to fight against multiple types of attacks from multiple directions. UAs fight in a coordinated but non-contiguous manner. In this way the enemy loses his ability to pursue his objectives and he soon loses his freedom of action. His units lose mutual support: his defense---integrity. He becomes dislocated. In due course as his support systems are attacked he loses the ability to communicate, direct fires and sustain. His forces disintegrate. This style of operational method requires commanders to conduct incisive "operational net assessments" to determine enemy strengths, weaknesses, centers of gravity, and decisive points. This is an art. It is also a way to identify objectives against which to commit forces. It also demands an imagination to find indirect approaches to these objectives as well as a sense of timing to sequence complementary, lethal actions.

In execution, the capability to see changing situations or opportunities is an imperative. More importantly is the mental and physical flexibility to adjust schemes to compensate for or exploit these changes. This must be tempered by an unshakable focus on one's objective. Networked, digital C4ISR among the distributed forces will both allow all units to see and hear these changes and quickly make needed adjustments in response. Note, however, for this to happen a great trust must exist among leaders and subordinates. Subordinates must accept the responsibility for seizing the tactical initiative. Leaders must, one, demand this from subordinates; two, exploit successes; and, three, underwrite setbacks. Military professionalism at each level of command will be vital.

Long-range, precision fires and C4ISR offer the possibility to reach over enemy armies to directly strike at what they hope to defend or preserve. Precision strategic strikes closely coordinated and timed with converging UEs would present a defending enemy a most difficult dilemma. The capability to execute powerful and sustained attacks against key political, economic, and military targets deep into the enemy's rear has the potential to preempt any organized resistance. Defending enemy field forces would be helpless. They could not defend what they have been tasked to protect. Further their own ability to fight with effect within their immediate areas would be degraded.

The above describes simultaneous engagement and distributed operations. "Forces distributed throughout the battlefield act in concert to multiply the effects achieved, while their dispersion simultaneously reduces vulnerabilities to enemy counters. Collectively, these capabilities will reinforce the effects of fires/interdiction, present a set of multidimensional options to paralyze and overwhelm the enemy, and lead to rapid collapse of enemy forces."¹³

This operational concept, focusing on rapid movements over strategic distances, the indirect approach, simultaneous attacks by distributed forces throughout the depth of the theatre, and strikes

against enemy centers of gravity, champions an American “deep battle *blitzkrieg*.”¹⁴ An argument for the offense, the Objective Force concept, acknowledges both the United States’ strategic challenges and requirements and the unchanging nature of war. As for the adversary it is optimize to engage, it will not concede the operational or tactical initiative. We seek to continue unique American skills at arms such as strategic power projection and joint warfare while combining them with lessons learned from modern history’s most brilliant campaigns. We wish to shape and exploit technologies to effectively combine strategic, operational and tactical levels of war into one fluid, hard-hitting fist.

LEADERS

The proposed capabilities of the Objective Force and the nature of our contemporary operating environment offer huge challenges to both today’s and tomorrow’s leaders. The requirement to alert, deploy and fight within 96 hours against any enemy around the world will require units, in fact, to be ready in fact, not just on paper. The ability for UAs to vertically deploy into a theatre and shortly thereafter move off to objectives within will demand of soldiers and leaders an independence of spirit and aggressiveness that many today may think are not compatible with disciplines normally associated with military life. The requirement to coordinate such a complex tactical “system of systems” to achieve overwhelming combined-arms and air-ground effects at any given point on the battlefield and to do so on short order may seem to much to ask of our junior leaders.

Advances in weapons, equipment and information technologies indicate that future battle will be more violent, lethal, rapid and decentralized. These technologies will demand of leaders to observe, assess, decide and act more rapidly than they are required to today. Much more information will be made available to leaders. Regardless, what will remain will be the doubts about the enemy’s intentions and complete capabilities. This will, as always, put great pressure on leaders.

The ever increasing loneliness of the battlefield will put increasing pressure on our leaders. Better means of communication and increased ranges for target acquisition and armed engagement will make for a more dispersed battlefield. That coupled with increased speeds for sea, air and land transport will further widen a leader’s areas of operation, influence and interest (i.e. battle space). Our future leaders will be compelled to be individuals of exceptional stamina, discrimination and judgment. Independence and self-confidence will be essential.

Tomorrow as today our soldiers will ultimately break our enemies physically and psychologically through direct combat. To do so, they will need purpose, direction and motivation by their leaders. That is why leadership will remain the most important aspect of combat power.¹⁵ In this regard a leader’s duties will remain the same...decide and lead. They will remain responsible to identify objectives, visualize end states, assess capabilities and describe intended schemes. Motivating, teaching and doing are how they will inspire and prepare soldiers to win.

In the end, we have to take stock of what emerging technologies are telling us about the future of battle. Just imagine what serving officers in the 1898's, just after the end of the Indian Wars, may have thought about the future of war. How many would have envisioned the industrialized mayhem of 1918? Did they see what the internal combustion engine, quick-firing artillery or the machine-gun would do to the battlefield? Could they have imagined gas warfare? All of this would meet some of them or their subordinates in a short twenty years. What will we see?

Questions about technological innovations, changes in strategic challenges or the very nature of our future enemies notwithstanding, we will have to be prepared for and willing to do what is necessary to win in combat both today and tomorrow. As leaders and soldiers these are our responsibilities to the nation and our fighting troops. We can take heart that the nature of combat will not change. It will remain, at its core, a brutal test of human wills. What will remain the edge in winning will be the quality and fighting spirit of our soldiers. The bravery, tenacity, endurance and skills they possess will determine victory over our armed opponents more so than any other quality our Army may have. The degree to which our soldiers possess the will and skill to best our foes is, and will certainly remain, a question of their leadership.

Our leaders today, trying to gain a view of future war, offer the idea of the Objective Force. It is intended to be ubiquitous and hard hitting. Much of what has been written about it today reads of many qualities that will make it particularly well suited for offensive operations. It is my judgment that if indeed this concept is targeted toward decisive campaigns it will demand qualities in leadership reflecting a certain bias. That is, leadership that possesses skills and attributes that have been shared by many of those who have proved to be particularly adept at more aggressive forms of fighting and campaigning.

I do not wish to present a comprehensive theory of effective military leadership nor propose, as I have stated earlier, a dramatic shift from what we already have outlined in our existing doctrine. I do, however, wish to suggest that some leadership skills attributes are and have proven to be particularly important in conduct of offensive operations. Distributed operations, increased movement rates, highly lethal weapons of great range and the enormous amount of information that can be made available at any time will test the strength and confidence of leaders above and beyond what we have seen heretofore. If nothing else, the scope and rate of movement in Objective Force operations will demand more from our leaders in terms of understanding, decisions and action. I shall attempt to offer some idea of the salient leadership attributes that will be needed by Objective Force leaders here in this segment of this paper.

First, accepting one's responsibilities will remain the point of departure for any military leader. This reality will have to remain central in the minds of Objective Force leaders. It will have to be reflected in our ethos and in the course our daily duties. Simply put we are and will remain responsible for winning. Victory in battle will continue to be our central task. Short of that it will be all

preparations needed to win. This means results: getting things done. No leader can take great comfort in the knowledge that he has followed his orders. This reality should not be a burden. Its “joyful” acceptance, rather, will serve as both a powerful license and secure harbor. This Idea, though painfully simple, will be the bedrock of all of an Objective Force leader's assessments, decisions and actions. The requirement to be alerted, deployed and in theatre within 96 hours will bring a new understanding to the idea of readiness. Ready will mean ready to move and fight and to fight alone if need be. Objective Force leaders will have responsibilities in garrison that will have to be met regardless of perceptions of security or the unlikely possibility of war. This reality will be something akin to what our leaders have faced in ranger battalions since the 1970's or the “border squadrons” of U.S. Army Europe before 1989.

Second, knowing what needs to be done, that is, knowing one's mission, is what will continue to provide a military leader aim. It will continue to bring reason to one's service and justify the sacrifices. For an Objective Force leader, the capacity to know one's mission at any given time will be essential. These operations will be fast-paced and the opening stages in theatre will be vague. A leader will not be able to assume that one's immediate superiors will always provide clear objectives, tasks, and means with such clarity and measure that all one will be faced with is the responsibility to devise a scheme, order action, and lead in the execution of the same. Without question, at times, one's duty will remain to execute prescriptive orders which leave little doubt for interpretation and to do so with grim determination. For the most part a leader will be left to his devices to “restate his mission.” This will remain particularly the case given the complexity of senior command and the confusion of battle. How a commander or leader will define his mission will be most directly guided by his superiors' intents and what the circumstances will allow. This will continue to be a huge challenge of command. It will not change in the future with the fielding of the Objective Force. The mission will continue to define objective and give a unifying purpose to a unit. Knowing what must be done and why will fortify a commander and the command in general. This will be particularly the case in the hardest of times. It will also help to identify and assess opportunities. Given this, it will be vital that commanders communicate clearly with one another. A common view of what must be done and how each action affects the other and the accomplishment of the general aim will remain essential to unity of effort. The power of the proposed “common operational picture” and “collaborative command” enabled by C4ISR and “battle command on the move” will prove important to this very human condition of war and battle.

Third, the will to get things done shall continue to be of great importance. It is perhaps more a reflection of character than intellect. It is certainly strengthened by the knowledge of what must be done and why. But it is and will remain more often the result of a leader's self-confidence and moral certitude. It shall remain the quality that allows a leader to stare down uncertainty, bad news and risk. Will and courage, when present, shall also continue to be infectious. They motivate soldiers to

overcome any obstacle and reach their greatest potential. With this done, the power of a fighting organization can only be outdone by overwhelming odds. The most important decisions will be choices among bad options. Knowledge of one's mission and the will to get it done shall allow those decisions to be taken in a timely and decisive manner. A leader's strength of will shall continue to be reflected in the fighting spirit the soldiers. Given that combat shall remain a test of opposing human wills this energy may prove decisive. The example provided to us by Lieutenant General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson is invaluable. His 1862 Valley Campaign not only is a lesson on maneuver but also of the power of one man's will and what it can do to motivate soldiers, his "foot cavalry", to do the unimaginable. It also illustrated how his superior will could convince a numerically superior enemy to surrender the field and seek security in the rear. As a young cadet General Jackson once wrote: "You may be whatever you resolve to be." At Manassas (twice), in the Shenandoah, at Fredericksburg and at Chancellorsville he resolved to be victorious. Indeed he was.

Forth, aggressiveness will be essential. This will remain a question of temperament. It will remain a quality that will be best measured by a leader's actions. It shall come, as it always has, in "many shapes and sizes" and will remain not so readily assessed based upon a superficial knowledge of a soldier's personality. Aggressiveness will continue to fire imagination and heighten the energy needed to find or make opportunities. It will be essential to the will to do battle and to close with and destroy the enemy. It was once said that the Spartans never asked about the number of their enemies but only their location. If true, it speaks volumes about why that city-state may have prevailed for as long as it did. As knowledge of one's mission provides focus, or the will to accomplish it gives power to get it done regardless, aggressiveness will provide velocity. This quality shall remain particularly important for a leader on the offense. To decide an outcome, tactical or operational, one must remain prepared to seize and maintain the initiative. Setting those terms will be done by leaders who not only can visualize what must be done to affect those conditions but are willing to act to make them a reality. Acting more rapidly than the enemy will remain vital. All of this will remain a product of an aggressive spirit.

Fifth, related to aggressiveness, is operational and tactical initiative. It is essential in all military operation, but especially offensive. It demands that we do not fight the enemy's fight. We are to set and dictate the terms of action throughout the battle or operation. We are to "compel the enemy to conform to friendly operational purpose and tempo."⁶ Given our assessment of current and potential adversaries this would mean we would never give him the chance to delay or find sanctuary.

Anticipating events, we must act before or react faster than the enemy. For leaders and soldiers these operations are not for those who need certainty and constant direction from central authority.

From an individual perspective, initiative is the ability to be a self-starter, to act when there are no clear instructions or when the situation changes. An individual leader with initiative is willing to decide and initiate independent actions when the concept of operations no longer applies or when an unanticipated opportunity leading to the accomplishment of the commander's intent presents itself. Despite advances in C2 from digital technology, individual initiative remains important for successful operations. In battle, leaders exercise this attribute when they act independently within the framework of the commander's intent. They trust their subordinates to do the same.¹⁷

Of significance importance is the question of tactical initiative. The attacker never wants to concede it even in the most uncertain of situations. Being able to dictate the terms of action throughout an engagement is how an enemy is compelled to fight the attacker's fight. Forcing an enemy to simultaneously face multiple, violent threats from multiple directions in a short period of time is the best way to overwhelm his ability to fight and resist. This couple with an unrelenting pressure by the attacker to close greatly pressures the enemy. It compels the enemy to rapidly decide to either hold his position, and face destruction, or to surrender the field. This is how engagements are finished quickly, enemy units defeated, and ground taken.

Sixth, the professional knowledge of battle, soldiers, tactics and weapons will be essential. It will continue to be the result of endless study of both the art and science of war. Study, reflection, training and experience will remain the ways. The knowledge of battle and soldiers in battle should continue to make a leader aware of its enduring nature and cost. An understanding of tactics and the never ending impact of weapon technologies on the evolution of tactics shall continue to be fundamental to a commander's assessment of capabilities and limits of the forces under his charge. Competencies in the understanding and conduct of fighting will provide a leader confidence and strength of will. It will continue to warn him that there are no fixed rules and certainty is never to be expected. It, however, shall also alert him to the fact that opportunity, though most often fleeting, abounds. The question of whether opportunity will be identified and acted upon will remain very much a function of a leader's bias, knowledge of the circumstances at hand, disposition of forces and tolerance for risk. The study of battle will remain, therefore, essential. Its study will continue to show leaders that they are not alone. They will see that the challenges that they will meet have been experienced before. It will give them knowledge, confidence and a stronger capacity for inductive reasoning.

The development of an appreciation of the power of surprise is particularly important in this effort. It is real. Our profession's most successful field commanders have exploited it. It is an aspect of war and combat that is most human. Its appreciation, however, is difficult to develop. In the course of most conventional training it is challenging to reward the leader who is most disposed to try to leverage it. Many are content to error on the side of conservative tactics since rarely do leaders expect their trainers to appreciate their efforts nor are many units at levels of collective training

readiness that these leaders can deftly expend the energy to set conditions to achieve surprise in the course of operations.

Combat being a test of opposing human wills, a commander should never overlook the opportunity to surprise his enemy. An enemy surprised is an enemy whose will is vulnerable. The degree to which a commander may surprise his opponent is very much a question of how well he knows his enemy. To surprise an enemy the commander must be able to determine what the enemy is or is not prepared for. The question of how to adversely affect the enemy's will or resolve to fight in the end, in my opinion, is a subjective call. Experience, common sense, and a bit of intuition are what a commander must rely upon to devise tactics aimed at attacking an enemy's moral will to carry on. Empathy, cunning, and ruthlessness can result in the most interesting of tactical concepts. Certainly swiftness and violence in execution would be key components in such tactics.

The Objective Force's knowledge based operational concept can play an important role. Advanced C4ISR and a "collaborative information environment" (CIE) would provide a commander "information superiority" (IS) over his opponent. An Objective Force field commander is intended to have the potential to know more about the battlefield situation than the enemy and more rapidly too. Knowing terrain, weather, and light conditions at a level superior to that of the enemy would be a distinct advantage. More so, the ability to see most of the dispositions of both friendly and enemy forces across the area of operations would give a commander an even greater advantage. With this superior view and his own talents at assessing its tactical or operational significance he would thus be able to identify great opportunities to catch his opponent off guard.

In sum, surprise is a result of doing the unexpected and, at times, unreasonable. Breaking rules or norms can catch an enemy unaware. There is of course an element of risk associated with these efforts. Knowing that one has achieved surprise is an important point. Note that the effects of surprise rapidly evaporate and with them opportunities. A local tactical success if rapidly reinforced and exploited can seize these opportunities. Key is identifying, reinforcing and exploiting a success faster than an enemy can recover and react. Speed, information superiority, and asymmetry matter here. It is how tactical success can be turned into an operational opportunity. It is how local surprise can turn into operational surprise.

The Objective Forces proposed capabilities would grant a commander superb potential to achieve surprise throughout the course of a campaign. The Objective Force's intended speed, fire power, and C4ISR would give a commander all the tools he would need to strike an enemy in a place, time, or manner for which the later could not respond. We should, therefore, look to develop training strategies that make operational and tactical surprise key objectives.

Leaders must work hard to develop an understanding of armed combat. Operational maneuver means tactical engagements. Engagement means fighting. The ability to win engagements is essential to successful campaigns. This is the case if we envision a campaign

executed by distributed units on a non-contiguous battlefield. This is especially the case if the operational design is to put these units into the depth of the enemy's rear areas. Areas in which the ability to move to reinforce a troubled friendly unit would be seriously challenged. Study would further show that success in battle is most often granted to those who most effectively apply joint and combined-arms methods. Well trained, well equipped, and aggressive units that maneuver as genuine all-arms teams enjoy great advantage. This is especially so if they are led by decisive, courageous, and clever leaders.

Speed of action and overwhelming violence to break an enemy physically and psychologically are also lessons leaders should be trained to understand. Maneuver with the combined effects of all-arms that force our foes to face strikes from many directions are the ways by which battles and engagements are won decisively. The unexpected and simultaneous appearance of a number of UAs in areas where the enemy would not expect American forces would cause surprise. We have discussed that. If this general surprise were immediately acted upon with the rapid maneuvers of UAs, each operating in a distributed fashion throughout the depth of the enemy's area of operation, the initial advantage of surprise could be extended. A string of stunning tactical victories, each inducing a degree of local shock, could further the enemy's "moral and material" imbalance. With a spreading physical and psychological paralysis, the enemy operational commander would lose the ability to react with effect. A cascading and uncontrollable set of reverses could begin to erode the will of enemy soldiers to resist.

In the mean time our SU would allow us to see and exploit these successes. We could increase the level of operational tempo. The enemy would face an ever increasing level of violence at an ever increasing pace of activity. The German campaign in France in June 1940 would be an example of this as would the Israeli June offensive in 1967.

Some tactical engagements will prove decisive for the conduct of rapid operations. The more rapidly these engagements can be joined and finished the more rapidly operational opportunities can be made and exploited. The speed at which these fights are concluded and acted upon must be greater than the ability of the enemy to recover and react to counter. This leverage will be a function of unit fighting skills and decisiveness of field commanders.

The potential for Objective Force UAs to execute these types of tactics is great. This knowledge will thus motivate leaders to do their best to train and prepare themselves and their units to win. Armed with this understanding they would make their units hard, powerful, and fast.

Leaders must understand that combat engagements are not only where the fate of campaigns are decided but, indeed, are the essence of war. It is here that the core "human test of wills" plays out. In this crucible is where the efforts of armies to man, equip, and train units are put to the test. Fear and hatred are the dominate emotions. Courage, discipline, confidence, and reason are put

under great stress. It is where their skills as leaders will be placed under the severest of challenges. This understanding will bring meaning to the idea of "battle focused training."

The knowledge of battle will also serve as a catalyst to unleash the imagination of a leader to devise plans to win and to deftly direct change in execution. They will be able to note that the best field commanders were particularly skilled at the study of terrain and enemy. They were also skilled at how to engineer opportunity by devising simple, deadly and tailored tactics to given situations. Ways to surprise an enemy came to them quickly because their knowledge of the enemy and convention allowed them to identify ways and means by which to be especially ruthless. Napoleon's admonition to "never do what the enemy wishes you to do" would ring true in their ears. As clearly as how to surprise an enemy, efforts to create conditions for deception thus became justified. Understood also were tactics devised to exploit the temporal effects of surprise. The importance of speed, decentralized command and reserves became obvious.

Our Plan called for a simultaneous strike...[the] air force was to launch a pre-emptive attack....At the same moment Tal's tanks would assault Rafa and El Arish along the coast while I hit Abu Agheila and Kusseima on the central axis. Between us, Yoffe's division would traverse the supposedly impassible sands of Wadi Haridan isolating the two battlefields and racing toward the Egyptian forces in the interior....Yoffe's movement would be a special surprise, since it was universally believed that vehicles could not move on the sand in that area....My division's primary task, then, was to open the central axis....Although the Egyptian headquarters was at Kusseima, Abu Agheila was the more formidable position. Were I to take Kusseima first, I would still have to deal with Abu Agheila. But if Abu Agheila fell, we would be in control of the roads behind Kusseima, and the Egyptians would find the position untenable. So there was no question about where to strike...To destroy Abu Agheila it would be necessary to identify and exploit the position's inherent vulnerability....So the plan of battle would have to emphasize concentration of force, surprise, and maneuver. And the action would take place at night...In 1956 the Israeli forces had attacked from the south. Now I decided to attack from the north, west, and east. Going from the north would surprise the Egyptians and would let me get quickly to the roads behind both Abu Agheila and Kusseima...What I had in mind was a closely co-ordinated attack by separate elements....in a continuous unfolding of surprises.¹⁸

Ariel Sharon, Commander Southern Command, Israeli Defense Forces, would take Abu Agheila by storm in one day on 5-6 June 1967. He would take the Egyptian strong point with a vertical envelopment by paratroopers, a deep envelopment by a tank brigade, and frontal assault by a mechanized brigade with the direct support of a separate tank battalion. "Tahboula" or shock was intended to imbalance the defenders as was the direct assault of enemy vulnerabilities. This combined-arms assault was specifically design to prevent the enemy from fighting his own combined arms battle. Sharon's soldiers would suffer thirty-two dead and 140 wounded. Nineteen Israeli tanks were destroyed. The Egyptians would lose control of nearly 8,000 men with an unknown number

killed. 40 of 88 tanks and self propelled guns were destroyed and two battalions of artillery overrun. Most importantly Sharon would be able to pass forward the IDF's main effort, Yoffe's division. The Egyptian command on notification of the loss of Abu Ageila became "surprised, shocked, and demoralized."¹⁹ The Egyptian Commander, Field Marshal Amer would order a general withdrawal to the west bank of the Suez Canal on 5 June 1967.²⁰

Implicit in the above is the acceptance of risk as a normal condition of the battlefield. That is especially the case the more aggressive the tactics chosen. How an enemy will react to an action is in the end an unknown. Experience, self-confidence, and the will to win strengthen a commander in the face of these uncertainties. Note that Sharon spent weeks with his command training them for this action before 4 June 1967;

But through it all I strove to make my division a cornerstone of self-confidence.... I never allowed myself to say, "Look, if I do not have such and such a force the job will be impossible." I just adapted the plan. We trained all the time, under very tight discipline. And from day to day I became more sure of our ability, more convinced that we were capable of achieving a truly great victory....²¹

Beyond training his unit for this specific and operationally important task, at a personal level Sharon had spent a professional career preparing himself for this action;

It was a complex plan. But the elements that went into it were ones I had been developing and teaching for many years, starting back in 1953 with the paratroopers--the idea of close combat, nightfighting, surprise paratrooper assault, attack from the rear, attack on a narrow front, meticulous planning, the concept of the "tahboulah," the relationship between headquarters and field command. This would be the first time I commanded a division. But all the ideas had matured already; there was nothing new in them.²²

Finally, flexibility of execution will be essential to fast-paced, offensive action. It shall remain so if one accepts that opportunities in battle will always be present and there for those looking to find them. Leaders will have to have the mental agility to see changing conditions in battle and be prepared to act on them. The degree to which leaders will possess this will remain a reflection of his attitude. Beyond this leaders will have to do what is needed to prepare their units to be as agile as they themselves are mentally flexible. This capacity will be reflected in the quality and type of training the commands receive, their material readiness and by the nature of their plans for battle. In regard to these "concepts of operations", the degree of emphasis on reconnaissance; depth in formation; size and location of reserves; and the positioning of leaders will be telling. To exercise flexible command the commander will be required be forward to see the field, the enemy and his own forces. He will continue to be required to be in communication with his fellow commanders;

superior, subordinate, and flank (however distant they may be) regardless. The intended capabilities of C4ISR and the ideas of “battle command on the move” will facilitate these requirements.

Our profession's most effective offensive commanders had both the skill and will to win. They understood battle and soldiers in battle. The uncertainty of battle, its danger and the presence of opportunity were accepted as facts. Their challenge was to prepare for them and exploit them when found or made. This knowledge was reflected in the way they trained their soldiers for action; how they formulated their plans; and from where they lead. Surprise, speed, violence and flexibility characterized their campaigns. Few ever missed opportunities to turn local successes into operational advantage. Decisiveness was their nature.

They were personally daring and highly creative persons. Skilled in the science of war, they were also, in practice, artisans. They always looked for chances to exploit the element of surprise and for ways to make tactical engagements decisive and ways toward operational advantage. Speeds of movement, rapid concentration and violence on contact were their tactics and operational method when on the offensive. They were always looking and finding ways to overcome numerically superior enemies and maneuvered to imbalance an enemy both in the short and long run of a campaign. They accepted the realities of close combat and did everything possible to prevail rapidly when accepted.

The Objective Force's potential offensive power will only be put into action when lead by daring, creative leaders who know their responsibilities and mission and have the will, professional competencies, aggressiveness, initiative and flexibility needed to prevail in battle and campaign. Their spirit, imagination and courage will allow for campaigns that will seek and leverage operational surprise. That coupled with knowledge of where and when to seek decisive tactical engagement and how to close those encounters rapidly will accelerate operations yet again. These leaders coupled with highly-motivated and skilled soldiers armed with the best weapons our industries can produce offer huge potential for rapid, decisive campaigns designed to preempt long costly wars.

CONCLUSIONS

I have outlined a short list of attributes and skills that I believe will be needed by successful leaders of future Objective Force combat units. Knowing one's responsibilities, mission and skills in addition to having the will, aggressiveness, initiative and flexibility to overcome the challenges and exploit the opportunities of the battlefield are very important. These skills and attributes were factors in the character and capabilities of modern military history's most successful leaders.

The question remains: will the Objective Force require a different sort of leader? In terms of what our doctrine requires today as outlined in FM 100-22, Army Leadership the answer is no. What is covered in that document offers trainers and commanders enough descriptive guidance with which to design training and educational programs to develop the skills and attributes that I have identified

as key. In fact the developing draft doctrine for Objective Force battle command does quite well in high-lighting key attributes and skills leaders must have in order to fully exploit the potential of intended Objective Force capabilities. Its discussions on “mission orders” and “mission command” are particularly interesting.

If we do have a challenge today it is in the demonstrated capabilities of many company grade and field grade officers leading our forces in the field. For well over a decade our combat training centers have identified lack of initiative, aggressiveness and flexibility as negative trends in many of our leaders and units. Opposing Force soldiers at these centers rarely encounter training units that execute operations with any degree of surprise or decisiveness. We do not seem to be improving upon these identified weaknesses regardless of the lessons of our Army’s history or the guidance of our existing doctrine.

Most disturbingly many leaders are loath to take decisions on their own without explicit authority from their superiors. Some think it is not their prerogative to aggressively act on their own initiative or to do so with out lengthy, detailed and highly coordinated planning. Many officers are not familiar with the real readiness status in their units. Some lack the technical and tactical knowledge to know. Others are too busy with meetings and administration to take the time to know. Inspection is a lost art.

Many units do not have dedicated professional development programs to study doctrine, tactics, operations and military history. What leaders may know is a function of individual self-study or institutional education. Perspective is thus narrow. What we discover as “new” lessons at our after action reviews is most often the doctrine or history we never knew.²³

In terms of training and culture we have challenges. This has to be repaired by commanders and leaders. If we do not do so: indeed, we will need a new kind of leader for the Objective Force. To reverse these negative trends commanders will have to take a hard look at how they educate and develop leaders in their organizations. Developing command climates and training events that identify and reward initiative and aggressiveness is very important. Part of that is the sincere willingness to underwrite honest mistakes. Establishing genuine professional trust is thus vital.

Unit professional development programs and ensuring leaders are developing themselves with self-education are points of departure. Leaders should be encouraged to read doctrine and selected military histories. The aim here is to develop an understanding of tactics, operations and battle command. Terrain walks and staff rides can do much to reinforce this and build unit cohesion. All of this widens perspective. This will allow more effective learning, understanding and adaptation in collective training and combat. It will give more structure and points of reference in periods when leaders reflect on lessons learned.

Quality collective training and organizational procedures focused on battle and readiness for battle are also ways to give leaders a sense of responsibility. They also establish a true sense of

professional priority. High standards aimed at readiness and holding leaders to account help build a sense of purpose and ownership. An understanding of battle, mission, priorities and duties develops attributes and skills that give developing leaders self confidence and independence. This will reinforce aggressiveness and initiative. This is essential.

The Objective Force concept offers an idea about future warfare and combat. Looking at what technology may offer and the current strategic trends, it proposes an idea for dominant joint, interagency and multi-national warfare. Its capabilities are intended to provide the United States an expeditionary force that can deploy large, well-armed forces on short notice to any region of the world. It will be a highly-mobile, all-arms force capable of conducting rapid campaigns.

We shall aim toward decisive objectives. The "indirect approach" will be our way both at an operational and tactical level. We will aim to preempt, dislocate and disintegrate our adversaries. Though we will aggressively maintain our focus on our objectives, we will flexibly react to events and opportunities in execution. When we accept battle, we will have the ability to annihilate our foes with a combined fires-strike and close assault. Combined-arms and air-ground cooperation will be fundamental. Operational tempo will be maintained through additional force deployments, rapid moves, decisive engagements and well-timed sustainment.

The *sine qua non* for the above is leaders that see the potential of these campaigns as possible. These leaders and fighters must have both imagination and knowledge to devise campaigns and tactics that are beyond the enemy's ability to react. They must be master trainers, skilled men-at-arms, and tacticians. They must know the means of battle around which to build a campaign. They must understand the power of the element of surprise and know how to achieve it. The study of terrain and enemy is implicit and must come easily to them. They must be ruthless in pursuit of victory and in engagement with the enemy. They must have the will to dare.

Word Count: 10,560

ENDNOTES

¹ “Deep Battle” was a concept developed by Soviet theorists in the 1920’s and 1930’s. Marshals Triandafillov and Tukhachevskii, both Tzarist-trained officers and veterans of the fast-paced battles of the Russian Civil War, envisioned the idea of a deep operations theory. They did so as they looked toward the eventual mechanization of armies and the Soviet Government’s desire for an offensive security strategy. The idea was to attack the enemy throughout his rear with fast moving, combined-arms forces in order to precipitate a general collapse of the enemy front. This was to be affected by the rapid penetration of the enemy forward lines. A “shock” army” was to penetrate the enemy’s front and “mechanized cavalry” to exploit the penetration into the enemy’s rear areas. Throughout the course of the penetration the “shock army” was to fix the enemy main body in its forward positions while the “mechanized cavalry” attacked enemy vitals. Airborne forces were to be employed to assist the rapid advance of the “mechanized cavalry” by seizing key objectives. “Simultaneity” was a key supporting concept. It aimed at getting as many troops as possible, as rapidly as possible, into contact with enemy units throughout the depth of the battlefield. In contact with powerful and mobile forces to his front and rear the enemy would be forced to fight in many directions at once. Further, the concept of “interchangeability” was also proposed. This suggested the alternate use of fires and maneuver troops to accomplish similar tasks. Fires were viewed to have the potential to fix, contain, or neutralize enemy forces if only for brief periods. This was to allow maneuver forces to pursue objectives of greater importance. The enemy was to be penetrated, dislocated, and annihilated in battles of encirclement. What was never made clear in the Soviet Field Service Regulations was how this concept was to be controlled in practice. Decentralization of command authority was not compatible with political prerogatives of the time. This and the army purges of 1937 would prove reasons among many for the disastrous battles of 1939-1943. This “deep battle” concept ultimately proved devastatingly successful in the Soviet campaigns of 1944-45. Exigencies of total war helped Soviet leaders sort through the challenges of developing a practical concept for battlefield command and control. In the late 1960’s this “deep battle” concept was modernized with the advent of the mechanized infantry combat vehicle, BMP; operational maneuver group tactics; and mechanized airborne formations. Note that even in this theory’s earliest inception Tukhachevskii believed that this concept would require huge formations. He did not believe that a hand full of small, elite formations would have the power to execute operations of this scale for any period of time in a war against industrialized enemy nations. This along with its operational level focus made the Soviet vision markedly different from that of the western European theorists.

² Huba Wass de Czege and Richard Hart Sinnreich, “Conceptual Foundations of a Transformed U.S Army” The Land Warfare Papers No. 40 (Arlington, VA.; AUSA, Mar 2002), 4.

³ Ibid., 5.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Huba Wass de Czege and Richard Hart Sinnreich, 5.

⁶ U. S. Army, Objective Force Operational and Organizational Concept, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0, Final Draft (Fort Monroe, VA, 18 December 2001), 10.

⁷ TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-92, 30.

⁸ Huba Wass de Czege, BG, US Army, Ret., "New Paradigm Tactics and Tactical Organizations: How to think about design and fighting the Future Combat System based tactical organizations" (25 October 2001), 19.

⁹ U.S. Army, Battle Command for Army Forces Beyond 2010, TRADOC Pamphlet, Draft (Fort Monroe, VA, 7 June 2002), 13.

¹⁰ U.S. Army, Objective Force Operational Concept for Maneuver Units of Action, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-90 (Fort Monroe, VA, 7 November 2001), 6.

¹¹ TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-92, 23.

¹² U.S Army, Operations, FM3-0 (Washington, D.C., June 2001), 4-13.

¹³ TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-92, 23.

¹⁴ Having outlined the roots of "deep battle" above, I shall outline here the same for '*blitzkrieg*' or lightening war. This phrase was coined by the British press as it looked for ways to describe German operational method in 1939-1940. The German doctrine and practice of mechanized, combined-arms warfare in the first half of the Twentieth Century was championed and lead by Field Marshal Guderian. Following their traditions of command decentralization and encirclement operations as well as the tactical lessons of the First World War, the Germans developed a combined-arms concept for modern mobile warfare built around key emerging technologies; the tank and airplane. Like the Soviets, the Germans sought to win wars with rapid, decisive campaigns exploiting penetrations, fast-moving armored formations and paratroopers. The Germans also envisioned the need to attack the enemy throughout his depth to cause a general collapse of enemy forces. Guderian describe his view as "cutting the spokes of a wheel." What marked the German concept unique and initially more viable, however, was much better develop doctrines and capabilities. The Germans made better use of radios; allowed for decentralized, mission tactics; fielded well trained, combined-arms maneuver units; and developed techniques for tactical air-ground integration. Unlike the Soviets, the scale of their vision was on an order of magnitude less than Tuchachevskii's. For the Germans this development was more evolutionary than revolutionary. It complemented its philosophical biases about war, combat and leadership more readily. Further, it was a natural progression from the infiltration tactics it had perfected in the First World War. This, as well as the general lack of preparedness of its enemies early in the Second World War, account for Germany's startling initial successes between 1939 and 1942. Note the German focus seemed to be more tactical than operational in out look. I propose that we adopt the best ideas of both "deep battle" and "blitzkrieg" concepts; much like we so superbly did in the of 1944-45, but, of course, adapted to more modern means.

¹⁵ Combat power is composed of firepower, mobility, protection, information and leadership.

¹⁶ Ibid., 4-15.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ariel Sharon, *Warrior* (New York, N.Y., Simon and Schuster, 1989), 185-189.

¹⁹ George W. Gawrych, Dr., Key to the Sinai: The Battles for Abu Ageila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars (Ft. Leavenworth, KS., U.S. Army Command And General staff College, 1990), 117.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Sharon, 185.

²² Ibid. 190-191.

²³ These observations are based upon personal and detailed knowledge of scores of training rotations at the National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center and the Combat Maneuver Training Center as an opposing force soldier, observer controller and unit commander. Much was during five years of duty at these combat training centers.

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